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ADJUDICATION OF THIRD PARTY PAYIANT
FOR HIGH DOSE CHEMOTHERAPY &
BONE MARROW RESCUE IN THE TREATIENT
OF BREAST CANCER
William Giese, MD.
Editor's Note: This article is intended to contrast and develop some
ofthe concepts and issues explored in an article -ritten by Jessica
Basso, published in the December 1996 issue of the DePaulJotnlal
OfHealth CareLam.

INTRODUCTION
It has been said while the focus of science is progress,the focus of the
legal system isprocess.1 Consequently, conclusions drawn by science on
a subject cannot be compared to the conclusions drawn by law on the
same subject This fact has become especially evident in light of the
debate on court-ordered third-party payment for unproved medical
procedures, an issue that has spawned an ongoing legal battle over
insurers' responsibilities to reimburse for high-dose chemotherapy and
bone marrow rescue in the treatment of breast cancer.
There are two main forms of bone marrow recovery: autologous
bone marrow transplantation (ABMT); and peripheral stem cell rescue
(PSCR). While some courts acknowledge that these two forms of
treatment are essentially the same procedure, others do not. This article
will address this issue by beginning with a synopsis of the development
of this method of breast cancer therapy, and then turning to a case law
discussion on whether third-party insurers should be forced to fund this
procedure.
In particular, this article will attempt to analyze the confusion that
"ha ieshtedoinsdfne of the coiirt decisions on this issue, particularly
""B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1980; M.D., University of Wisconsin School of Medicine,
1984;
J.D. (Card.), Georgetown University Law Center, 1997.
1
"The scientists' emphasis on progress is replaced by the lawyere emphasis on process. Rather
than seeking greater knowledge of the natural world, the law seeks the peaceful resolution of
human disputes." STEvN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AmD SCI NCE iNA?,wuCA 13
(1994).
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whether the "yardstick" being used by the judiciary to decide whether such
treatment will or will not be reimbursed by third parties is inconsistent.2
When the rulings are considered in light of the judiciary's primary focus
onprocess,rather than medicine's emphasis onprogress,they may not be.
MEDICAL TREATMENT
Anti-cancer drugs are a relatively recent discovery. Interestingly, their
application in the treatment of human malignancy was a byproduct of
wartime research into poison mustard gas The initial response of
non-solid tumors (principally leukemia's and lymphoma's) to anti-cancer
drugs were encouraging, but short-lived.4 However, subsequent research
has resulted in the discovery of additional agents with activity.' Some of
these damage DNA,6 while others interfere with various aspects of the
cellular machinery.7 A discussion of the specific mechanisms of the
various agents is beyond the scope of this paper, but it has been found
generally that drug combinations which act through a number of means,
are superior to single-agent treatments.' The rationale for the employment
of increasingly greater doses of drug "cocktails" in the systemic treatment
of cancer is relatively straight forward: the greater the insull, the more
cancer cells are irreparably damaged.
Unfortunately, it is not only cancer cells that are injured by this
treatment, but also the body's normal cellular contingent is at risk. The
cells affected most significantly are ones that rapidly replicate. Of these,
2 See

Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging
ExperimentalMedicine?,44 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1113 (1992) (noting that the judicial response
to the payment by third-parties for new treatments "has been characteristically haphazard ... ).
3Vincent T. DeVita, Jr., PrinciplesofChemotherapy,in CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF4 ONCOLOGY 276,276 (1993).

kId

SSee generallyid
6

(chronicling folic acid antagonists as the next active drugs un.,overed).
See Richard F. Bakemeier, Basic ConceptsofCancerChemotherapyandPrinc ples ofMedical

Oncology, in CLINICAL ONCOLOGY FOR MEDICAL STuDENTS AND PHYsICIANS - A
MULTIDiSCipLnARYAPPROACH 82, 85-89 (1983).
7Id.

8 See generallyJay R. Harris et al., Cancerofthe Breast,in CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF ONCOLOGY 1264,1301-07 (1993) (outlining the trials which established combination
chemotherapy as the standard approach in the systemic treatment of breast cancer).
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one of the most sensitive lineages are the cellular precursors to red cells,
white cells, and platelets. These progenitor cells continually renew the
body's ability to transport oxygen, defend against infectious invasion, and
clot blood. In reality, all cancer is theoretically curable by the delivery of
increasing levels of chemotherapy, but it is clear that "throwing the baby
out with the bathwater" may sometimes result.9 Supportive care for this
treatment has also evolved sufficiently, through the use of intravenous
fluids and feedings, antibiotics, and blood product transfusions, to the
point where cancer patients can be maintained adequately while many of
the normal cell types repopulate. Of course, with high-dose chemotherapy
the precursors to blood cells may be destroyed completely, in which case
recovery will not occur.
One method that has made cancer treatment less damaging is the
transplantation of bone marrow from a healthy donor, if at least a partial
"antigenic match" can be found. 0 Because the requirement for a match
may restrict candidacy for transplantation, and thus preclude the use of
high-dose chemotherapy, other solutions have also been found. The most
common technique is to harvest cellular blood precursors, either through
a bone marrow biopsy, or by the phoresis of stem cells from the peripheral
blood, prior to the administration of high-dose chemotherapy. This
collection of marrow is stored appropriately, and reinfused following
chemotherapy exposure." The precursor cells then recolonize the bone
marrow and assume normal cellular production. In some cancers,
especially those of the blood cell lines, high-dose chemotherapy and
allogeneictransplantation have proven curative."2
9See Garrett A. Smith & L Craig Henderson, High-Dose Chemotherapy(HDC)ith Auto!ogous
•-Bone Marrow Transplantation(ABU7) for the Treatment ofBreast Cancer. Te Ju
A ,is Still Out,
in ImPoRTANTADvANCES INONCOLOGY 1995 201,209 (1995) (summarizing transplant-related
deaths of from 7 to 35 percent in reports from studies conducted between 1981 and 1989).
"See Ralph 0. Wallersteim, Jr. & Albert B. Deisseroth, Bone MarrowLfunction in th Cancr
Patient,in CANCER PBINCPI ANDPRACTICEOF ONCOLOGY2262,2272 (1993) (HLA antigens
found on the surface of cellular blood products can result in significant and potentially fatal host
immune reactions, dependent on the degree of mismatch).
I Id. at 2271.
'2 Allogeneic transplantation is when the bone marrow cells of someone other than the cancer
patient are transfused. Autologous, sometimes called syngeneic transplantation, is when the cells
of the patient are reinfused. See William P. Peters, High-Dose Chemotherapy
A1Mtologou
fith
Bone MarrowTransplantationforthe Treatment ofBreastCancer: Yes, in I-.OU.ANTADVANCES
iNONCoLOY 1995 215,216 (1995) (discussing a 12 percent cure rate at fifteen years by the us-.
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Method of Analysis
The method utilized in the clinical assessment of a novel or experimental
3
anti-cancer treatment involves a number of progressive steps or phases.
First, a Phase I study is conducted to determine the toxicity of differing
dose-schedules of chemotherapy." Testing then begins via a Phase II
analysis, where efficacy is determined by identifying those tumors which
respond.' 5 The final stage is Phase III testing, where superiority is
evaluated through the direct comparison of the new treatment to standard
16
therapy.
Studies Completed To Date
Clinical trials involving high-dose chemotherapy and bone marrow rescue
in the treatment of breast cancer have been limited to two patient
populations. One population includes patients with metastatic breast
cancer, where the outlook using standard-dose chemotherapy and/or
radiation is uniformly fatal. 17 The other population includes patients in the
earlier stages of breast cancer, where the likelihood of clinically
undetectable distant metastases is high. This latter group is typified by
patients found to have ten or more tumor-involved lymph nodes at
8

surgery.'

It has been more then a decade since the first Phase I trials of
high-dose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplantation for the
of high-dose chemotherapy, total body irradiation, and allogeneic bone marrow transplantation
in the treatment of recurrent acute myelocytic leukemia). See also Wallerstein & Deisseroth,
supranote 10, at 2272 (noting that the cure rate with allogeneic bone marrow transplantation,
when considering all forms of leukemia and lymphoma, approaches 50 percent),
I Richard Simon, Design and Conduct ofClinicalTrials,in CANCER: PRINCIPLE- AND PRACrICE
OF ONCOLOGY418, 418 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1993).
141d
16I1d

"7 See, e.g., Harris et a, supra note 8, at 1315 (noting that current therapy for metastatic breast
cancer is palliative, although the 'Judicious application of available treatment" can control the
disease for several months or years).
IsSee idt at 1323 (suggesting that it is women in this group, without clinically overt disease,
who are most likely to benefit from HDC-ABMI); see also Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at
206 (outlining the completed and ongoing trials regarding this high-risk population).
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treatment of cancer were initiated. 19 These studies demonstrated, as
hypothesized, that the delivery of higher then conventional doses of
chemotherapy

was indeed feasible when coupled with marrow

repopulation.? In the late 1980's, a number of Phase II trials in breast
cancer began. 1 As predicted, efficacy in the treatment of breast cancer
was established.?2 The "gold standard" in the assessment as to whether
HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR is superior to standard chemotherapy,
however, are Phase III prospectively randomized analyses?' Although

currently ongoing at several institutions, the results of Phase III testing are
not expected to be completed for several years.24 Though tempting, it is
scientifically unsound to draw conclusions about the superiority of one
treatment over another based on either the nonrandomized Phase II and I
data, or in comparison to historical controls? Nonetheless, many
conclusions have been drawn.

Cost of Treatment
The reported cost of a single HDC-ABMT runs from $80,000 to
$300,000.6 This amount has been reduced in recent years, owing largely

V9William P. Peters, High-Dose ChemotherapywithAutologousBone MarrowTransplantation
for the Treatment ofBreast Cancer: Yes, inIMtPORTANTADVACFS INONCOLOGY 1995 215, 216
(1995).
20 See id. at 218 (although "major" and "substantial" toxicity was reported in both the
single-agent and combination chemotherapy trials respectively).
21 Id.
' See Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 202-04 (reporting an average re4ponsa rate for I1
trials of 78 percent and a range of from 41 to 93 percent).
2 Id at2ll CAn analysis of the role of bone marrow transplantation for breast cancer is limited
by the lack of properly controlled clinical trials."); see also PetersM supranote 12, at 218 (Critical
to deciding the ultimate role of high-dose therapy in the treatment of breast cancer and other
diseases are the performance and analysis of well-designed and well-controlled randomized
clinical trials).
I Peters, supranote 19, at215 (Randomized, comparative trials have notyet ben rep orted, and
although they are currently undemay, results will notbe available for another three to four years).
See Smith & Henderson, supra note 9, at 201.
26
Id.at 206 (estimating an $80,000 per treatment cost); see also Saver, supra note 2, at 59
(quoting estimates in the literature of from $180,000 to $300,000 per HDC-ABMT).
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to advances in supportive care and experience.2 7 Estimates of the annual

aggregate cost of the treatment range from $240 million if limited to the
high-risk adjuvant setting,28 to $2.5 billion if all eligible women receive
9

treatment?2

The Controversy
The medical community remains divided on whether the lack of Phase III

prospective randomized data establishes HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR as
experimental by definition. 0 Currently, none of the peer reviewed
literature has stated that this treatments is "standard," although claims
proffered to the courts indicate otherwise.
Insurers argue that HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR is "experimental" in

nature and as such, reimbursement is not required.3' These carriers point
to the lack of data from randomized, prospective Phase I trias to support
this position.3 2 In response, proponents argue that only a small percentage
of the therapies considered "standard" today have undergone such

rigorous confirmation.

27

See Peters; supranote 19, at 228-29 (describing how the use of colony-stimulating factors and
intravenous antibiotics is shifting post-transplant management to an outpatient setting); see also
Robert Bazell, Topic ofCancer,NEWREPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1990, at 12 (describing how the cost of
HDC-ABMT dropped by approximately half once Blue Cross-Blue Shield reversed its
reimbursement policy, and the procedure was performed).
28 Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 206 (estimated by multiplying the approximate 3000
U.S. women with ten or more involved nodes and age less than fifty who are diagnosed annually,
by $80,000 per treatment).
I See Lawrence K. Altman, Insurerto Finance Test ofa Treatmentfor Breast Cancer,N.Y.
Tms, Nov. 12, 1990, atAl (estimated by multiplying the 25,000 candidates "who might benefit"
by, $100,000 per treatment).
" One recent publication presented in tabular form the dichotomy of opinions which have been
expressed in the literature. Interestingly, Peters, whose analysis was published simultaneously
with Smith's and Henderson's, and upon which the Eighth Circuit specifically relied upon in
reversing alower court injunction denial (Henderson v. BodineAluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961
(8th Cir. 1995)), has made comments qualifying for both The Optimists and The Skeptics
headings. See Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 212.
31
See, e.g., Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1993).
32
1d
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Health care costs are spiraling as they are, to a large extent, driven by
the evolution of new technologies?3 It follows then that the slowing ofthe
introduction of novel treatments is an appealing target for those who
desire to curb the rise. Although more than twenty-five years ago
confirming clinical trials for both newer and widely accepted treatments
were called for, this advice has been largely ignored.V 4
Technologies go though a series of stages upon their introduction3
HDC-ABMT or -DC-PSCR, has been placed by at least one
commentator, John B. McKinley, somewhere between "professional and
organizational adoption" and "public acceptance and state (third-party)
endorsement."' McKinley notes that it is in the stage of "randomized
clinical trials" that new medical treatments or techniques are often found
ineffective, or lacking in improvement compared to existing
methodologies.3 7 Although prestigious researchers may claim a new
treatment to be vastly superior, it may be disproved by subsequent
randomized study. Radical surgery in the management of breast cancer
is a case in point s

.3See, eag., HEmY I AARON, SEiuous AND UNSTABLE CoTDmoN: Frmcn.O AERwTCgs

HEALTH CARE 39-49 (1991) (outlining the five factors which have contributed to the rise in per
capita health expenditures in the United States, and concluding that the technological revolution
predominates).
I See Thomas C. Chalmers, Randomization and CoronaryArtery Surgery, 14 ANiALs OF
THoRAcic SuRGERY 323, 323-327 (1972) (listing avariety of treatments widely advocated and
adopted which were never tested by adequate clinical trials, a number of which were found
subsequently to be clinically worthless, and concluding that the medical profession should have
learned from these mistakes).
"SJohn B. McKinley, From "PromisingRepor t " to "StandardProcedure"."Seven Stages in the
Careerofa MedicalInnovation,59 MIBANKMM. FMND Q. 374 (1981).
11 McKinley outlines seven stages that new devices or procedures go through, although the order
may vary and certain stages may even be skipped. These are: 1) the stage of the promisingreport;
2) the stage of professional and organizational adoption; 3) the stage of public acceptance and state
(third-party) endorsement; 4) the stage of standard procedure and observational reports, 5) the
stage of the randomized clinical trial; 6) the stage of professional denunciation; and, 7) the stage
of erosion and discreditation. Id at 376-401.
371aL at 392-95.
3S J Katz, Tm SILENT WORLD OF DocroR.AND PATIENT 175 (1984), reprintedin GEORGE J.
ANNASErAL., AIMRICANHEALTHLAW350, 350-354 (1990) (noting the en-bloc breast and chest
wall resections advocated by the prominent surgeon William Halsted wererapidly adopted despite
being based upon anecdotal observations - eventually, controlled trials were completed which
demonstrated a significantly less aggressive approach equally effective).
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Both the medical community and insurance industry agree that
randomized, prospective Phase HI trials must be completed. The
accrual of patients for these studies however, has been slow. This is
largely because women have been reticent to participate in trials where
they might be randomized to conventional chemotherapy, which they are
convinced is markedly inferior' While the media is partially responsible
for this premature conclusion, 41 the majority of the blame rests squarely.
on the shoulders of the medical community for failing to confess their
knowledge is limited.'2 Consequently, it is the court to which insurance
carriers, physicians, and the public have turned to resolve the dispute.
BACKGROUND ON HIDC-ABMT AND HDC-PSCR
REIMBURSEMENT LITIGATION
Court decisions regarding whether or not insurers must pay for
HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR in the treatment of breast cancer have come
down from a number ofjurisdictions in recent years. The standard a court
will apply in deciding whether an insurer is responsible for the cost of a
" See Smith & Henderson, supra note 9, at 211 ("An analysis of the role of bone marrow
transplantation forbreast cancer is limited by the lack of properly controlled clinical trials."); sce
also Peters, supra note 19, at 218 ("Critical to deciding the ultimate role of high-dose therapy in
the treatment of breast cancer and other diseases are the performance and analysis of well-designed
and well-controlled randomized clinical trials."). See also Susan Gleeson, Reirnbursemcnt of
Biotherapy: PresentStatus, FutureDirections- Perspectivesofthe Third-PartyPayer,SEMINARS
INONCOLOGYNuRSiNGNOV. 1992,13, 13-16 (describing the views ofthe Blue Cross-Blue Shield
Association, and their commitment to financially support such studies).
40 Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 211 ("As a result of patients' insistence on obtaining
ABMT, many women who are eligible for randomized trials do not participate and instead search
for centers where all patients can receive a bone marrow transplant").
"I See id ("Many patients have preconceived expectations regarding the effectiveness of this
treatment based on anecdotal reports, the experience of family or friends, and the climate generated
by popular media"). See also McKinley, supranote 35, at 377 ("The careers of most medical
innovations seem to be launched with the appearance of an enthusiastic report on some promising
performance, increasingly in the mass media").
42 "[,V]e have raised the public's expectations far beyond what is supported by the published
we are treating with "intent to cure" and when we publiclyjustify the
data. [W]hen we suggest ...
we often mislead our patients who, in their
by [certain] statements ...
toxicity and costs ...

desperation, fail to hear the conditional nature of these phrases. When we say that a particular
therapy is a patientfs "only chance for cure," no jury in our society, ... which places a high value
on action, is likely to look critically at the evidence and deny a patient treatment" 1. Craig
Henderson, Window of Opportuniy, 83 . NATL CANCERMINsT. 894,895 (1991).
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particular patients treatment varies with the type of policy held. Initially,
when adjudication was centered mainly in the lower courts, patients were
often successful in obtaining injunctions against payment denials.
Insurance carriers responded to this trend through a number of
mechanisms, in particular by careful drafting of these insurance policies
to clearly express the insurer's intent to deny coverage. Recent appellate
decisions suggest this approach has been somewhat successful.
These high-profile court battles have not escaped the attention of
state and federal legislatures. In some states, and in the case of all federal
employees, coverage for HDC-AMBT or HiD C-PSCR is now mandated.
However, the core issue of whether this newer and costlier treatment is
indeed an improvement over prior therapy, remains unresolved.
There have been numerous published decisions stemming from
litigation to compel third-party payers (whether private, self-insured
employers, or the government) to reimburse providers for HDC-ABMT
or HDC-PSCR in the systemic treatment of breast cancer. Since 1991,
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the largest insurer in the country, has been the
only carier to fund the procedure on a pilot basis."3
The vast majority of cases have been heard at the federal district
level, although several decisions have "trickled up" to the appellate courts.
As of yet, neither the United States Supreme Court nor any State Supreme
Court has ruled on the issue. The published federal circuit opinions
reviewed for this report included those from the Third, Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.4 All but two ofthese opinions have
been handed down in the last three years. Reviewed decisions from the
43
Gleeson, supranote 39, at 13 (noting that Blue Cross-Blue Shield, "the country's largest and
oldestprovider of health care coverage," [atthat time] "serving 63 million members, or more than
one in four Americans," was the first insurer to agree to fund the procedure).
" See Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs, 97 F3d
950 (7th Cir. 1006); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996); Bailey v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1995); Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, Inc. 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical
Programs of the Uniformed Servs., 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995); Wolfv. Prudential, 50 F.3d 793
(10th Cir. 1995); Pitman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma, 24 F.3d 118 (10th Cir.
1994); Fujav. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1993); Bechtold v. Physicians
Health Plan ofN. Ind., Inc., 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994); Madonia v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Virginia, 11 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 1993); Heasley v. Belden and Blake Corp, 2F.3d 1249 (3rd Cir.
1993); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Dahl-Elmees v. Mutual of
OmahaLife Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993).
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federal district level include districts in Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Tennessee., Missouri,

Alabama, Washington, Oregon, South Dakota, Colorado, and the Northern
District of California. The vast majority of these cases were decided
within the last five years.45

Finally, state appellate court decisions reviewed for this article
include, the Court of Appeals of Michigan, the Appellate Court ofIllinois,

4

sMarro v. K.-II1 Communs. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.N.Y., 1996); Whitney v. Empire
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 920 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Bishop v. Office of Civilian
Health & Med. Programs of the Uniform Servs., 917 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Wash. 1996); Trustmark
Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chgo. Hosp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1614 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Esdale
v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 914 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. 111. 1996); Mattive v. Healthsourco
of Savannah Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D.Ga. 1995); Kost v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8151 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Grethe v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 881 F. Supp. 1160
(N.D. Ill. 1995); Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chgo Hosps., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS2105 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Frendreis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Missouri, 873 F. Supp.
1153 (N.D.Ill. 1995); Whitehead v. Federal Express Corp., 878 F. Supp. 1066 (W.D. Tenn. 1994);
Mashburn v. Mail Handlers Ben. Plan, 18 E.B.C. 2668 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Hasty v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250 9 N.D. Ind. 1994);
Lowery v. Healthchicago, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6380 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Hawkins v. Mall
Handlers Ben. Plan & Uniformed Civilian Health & Medical Programs of the Uniformed Servs.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671 (W.D. N.C. 1994); Gaecks v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers
Health Ben. Plan, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16876 (.D. 111. 1993); Regerv. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869
(N.D. Ga. 1993); Goepel v. Mail Handlers Ben. Plan, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13346 (D.N.J 1993);
Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); M.Leroy v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Oregon, Inc. 825 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D.Ga. 1993); Kekis v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Kelly v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield ofRhode Island, 814 F. Supp. 220 (D.RI., 1993); Maroney v. Prudenial Ins. Co. Of
Am., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19777 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Brown v. Michelin Tire Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15529 (D. Md.
1992); Helman v. Plumbers & SteamfittersLocal 166 Health & Welfare Trust; 803 F. Supp. 1407
(N.D. Ind. 1992); Dah-Elmers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Fla.
1992); Boland v. King Cty. Med., 798 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Wilson v. Group
Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 791 F. Supp. 309 (D.DC. 1992); Hirsch v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield ofMaryland, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20963 (D.Md. 1991); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Miss. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, 764 F.
Supp. 728 (D.Ct. 1991); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F. S Ipp. 586 (E.D.
Va. 1990).
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and the Colorado Court ofAppeals.4 6 These rulings were all made within
the last three years.
Privately Negotiated Policies Between Patient and Insurer
Policies negotiated directly between the patient and an insurance
underwriter are governed by the particular laws of the state in which the
agreement is consummated. Medicaid, as a state administered instrument,
as well as state or local government plans, fall into this category. In such
cases, the courts turn to the individual state's case law (common law) or,
47
when codified, their statutory provisions on contracts for guidance.
Here, consideration is given to the powers of bargaining and the specifies
around the policy drafted. Often, it is concluded that a contract of
adhesion is present.48 In order to protect the weaker party in such
situations, provisions of exclusion are narrowly construed. 9 Similarly,
ambiguous terms are viewed in a light most favorable to the weaker
party °
Some insurance policies specifically exempt certain treatments or
procedures from coverage, while other policies broadly exempt all
therapies of an "experimental" or "investigational" nature from
reimbursement. This latter approach has resulted in the vast majority of
litigation, largely because the term "experimental" has been called
ambiguous "on its face," and has never been defined clearly.51 Because of

"Tepev. Rockey MN
t.Hosp. & Med. Servs. 893 P.2d 1323 (Col. Ct App. 1994); O'Rourkev.
Access Health, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 214 (IlL App. CL 1996); Lubeznik v. Healthchicago, Inc., 644
N.E.2d 777 (IL App. CL 1994); In re Trull, 626 N.E.2d 252 (111.App. CL 1993); Falcon v.
Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.3d 44 (Mich. 1990); Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,
517 N.E.2d 864 (CL App. Mich. 1994).
47
See e.g., Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan ofN. Ind., Inc, 19 F.3d 322,325 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting that disputes over insurance policy coverage are matters of contract interpretation).
11 See, e.g., Saver,supra note2, at 1100-01.

'9Id.

"0See icL See also CIARK C. HAVIGHURST, HMLTH CARE CHOIcE-: PRVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSMTRUNTS oF HEALT- REFoRi 182 (1995) (discussing the contract law concept of contra
proferenter, which requires ambiguities in insurance contracts to be construed against the insurer,
as the drafter of the policy).
SI See Denise S. WVolf WoShoutdPayfor 'xperimental"Treatments? BrcortCar.:erPattnt
v. TheirInsurers,44 A. U. L. REV. 2029,2041-54 (1995) (comparing and contrasting the criteria
used by medicine and the insurance industry in determining what is and is not"e.\TerimentaP).
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this ambiguity, judges have looked to how the terms "experimental and/or
investigative" are defined in the individual policy.52 In situations where
more then one interpretation of a term is possible, the term is assigned the
meaning an average purchaser would apply.53 On the other hand, when a
contract is silent altogether on the issue, the decision of the court has
centered on whether it would be reasonable for the policyholder to expect
coverage.5 4
In settling this dispute, the Medicaid statute defers to the individual
states to determine what treatments will be covered, as long as the
decisions are "reasonable" and "consistent with the objectives" of the
Medicaid Act.5 Some authors have suggested this places fcr too much
discretion with the state, since funding for "medically necessary"
treatments may also be denied.5"
The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), which administers Medicare and Medicaid,
avoids using the terms "experimental," or "investigational," in lieu of
"reasonable" and "necessary."' 7 It is not surprising the courts find this
alternative wording equally vague. However, on the whole there have
been fewer rulings on Medicaid denials for -DC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR,
most likely because of state exemptions, combined with the low
reimbursements Medicaid provides.58

5 Harris v. Mut. Of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
53Id.

"I Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, Inc., 62 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Where a term is
ambiguous, we must construe it against the drafter, ... and in accordance with the reasonable
expectations of the insured").
' 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1995).
56 See GEORGE L ANNAS EIAL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 185-86 (1990) (noting that judicial
deference to coverage limitations proscribed by the state may, on occasion, result in medically
necessary services being denied - the test the court uses is whether the exclusion i:; "reasonable,"
which requires establishing only that the needs of most recipients would be met).
57 57 Fed. Reg. 24797,24804 (June 11, 1992).
" The low reimbursement rates typically seen with Medicaid patients make it unlikely the full
cost of this tre'atment will be recovered even when payment is uncontested. This is a fact the
medical community is acutely aware of; and may influence how often HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR
is therefore prescribed. Paradoxically, the lack of Phase III data may be seen as a "loophole" in
these cases, because it provides the doctor a degree of protection from a "failure to inform" claim
for not discussing this option. I have found no data directly supporting or refuting this statement,
but it is interesting to note the sparcity of litigation regarding the denial of coverage for
HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR in the Medicaid population.
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Medicare coverage is continually evolving and updates to the HCFA
Medicare Coverage Issue Manual are published in the Federal Register
quarterly.59 Although the vagaries of "reasonable and necessary" provided
contracting intermediaries with little coverage guidance in the past, this
is no longer a problem in regard to this particular treatment since from
mid-1992, autologous bone marrow transplantation for breast cancer
specifically has been excluded."0 Suits based on Medicare denials may
be removed to federal court, where the "federal common law" of contracts
applies.6' However, since these rigorous therapies are frequently limited
to those less then fifty years of age, Medicare patients are less likely to
undergo HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR.62
Federal employee plans, which are governed by the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), are also removable to federal
jurisdictions. Decisions on coverage are made first by the carrier, and any
denials are then reviewed through administrative proceedings by th6
Office of Personal Management (OPM).P The OPM manual has become
more specific about the procedures that will be covered, particularly in
regard to the treatment of cancer. An update of covered procedures is
published as a Statement of Contract Benefits for each health plan.64
Plans covering members of the United States military are governed by the
Civilian Health and Medical Programs of the Uniformed Services rules.
As with federal employees, disputes are heard in federal court. Ultimate
coverage determinations are made by the Director ofthe Office of Civilian
Health and Medical Programs of the Uniformed Services
5 57 Fed. Reg. 24797,24804 (June 11, 1992).
0 See id (explaining that while not specifically identifying breast cancer, the HCFA upd:ate lists
solid tumors (with the single exception ofneuroblastoma) under fNoncovered Conditions" with
regard to autologous bone marrow transplantation).
I See Caudill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 999 F.2d 74, 78 (4th Cir. 1993)
('The Supreme Court has held that some areas involving "uniquely federal interests" may be so
important to the federal government that a "federal common law" related to those areas will
supplant state law either partially or entirely." (quoting Boylev. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. SOD,
504 (1988))). See also Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, 62 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1995) (NWhile we

interpret an ERISA plan under federal common law, we may use principles of state common law
to guide our analysis.').
' See, e.g., Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 206 (estimating costs based on thoe women
who are both clinically eligible andyounger than age fifty).
63 5 C.F.R. § 890.105 (1995).
64 5 U.S.C. § 890.7 (1995).
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(OCHAMPUS). 65 The OCHAMPUS manual, like the OPM manual, has
become increasingly specific about payment exemptions.
Employee Welfare Benefit Plans
Employer-based self-insurance is governed by federal law under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6' These
type ofplans insure the majority ofAmericans working today. 7 Insurance
laws requiring companies to establish sufficient cash reserves have made
it is easier for large employers to achieve this status. More recently
though, smaller employers have pooled resources to qualify.
There are several advantages afforded carriers who provide insurance
under the broad aegis of employee welfare benefit plans.68 One advantage
is that ERISA exempts these group health plans from state regulation
including, among other things, coverage mandates. 69 As another
advantage, ERISA limits the plans liability in the proceeding to an
injunction against payment refusal, accrued benefits, or a judgment of an
entitlement to benefits under the plan.70 Under ERISA, claims of
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as
awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages, are exempted as
extra-contractual in nature.71 Under state laws, however, these claims may
be adjudicated coincidentally, if recognized.
There is also a theoretical advantage for the self-insurer who
becomes embroiled in reimbursement litigation, in that a more lenient
standard of review is applied. 7 If the plan grants the administrator
discretion to determine whether a certain treatment is "experimental" or

6 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.5, 199.7 (1995).
29 U.S.C. 1001-1461 (1995).
,See John K. Iglehart, The American Health CareSystem: PrivateInsurance,326 NEW ENO.
J. MED. 1715, 1718 (1992) (discussing a recent survey of employee benefits which showed 65
percent of 2408 employers insured their group medical plans in this manner).
6S See id at 1718-19 (reviewing the tax and other advantages of self-insurance).
6 Id (discussing the over 900 state mandates for coverage nationwide that ERISA-based plans
are exempted from).
70 29 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1)(B) (1995).
71
See 29 U.S.C. 1144 (1995). See also Wolf, supranote 54, at 2062.
'See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (defining when the do
novo versus the more lenient "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review applies).
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not, the court will defer to the administrator's decision, unless the
reviewer's findings were "arbitrary and capricious."'

On occasion, courts

analysis. 74

may also enlist an "abuse of discretion"
This advantage for the
selfinsured employer is theoretical; while some courts afford a great deal
of deference to the plan administrator, others may employ a sliding-scale
that decreases permissible deference depending on the amount of conflict

of interestZ5 Determination by the court as to whether a denial was
"arbitrary and capricious" is limited to the evidence used by the claims
reviewer in drawing his conclusion. 6
If apolicy does not explicitly place discretion in the hands of the plan
administrator, a de novo evaluation by the court will ensue. 71 In this case,

the principles of contract are again drawn upon, although the federal
common law of contracts also applies.73 Additionally, when a court
reviews de novo, it may look to sources that were not explicitly before the
reviewer when the issue initially was decided. Although this standard of

review is broader, in both situations the proceedings are limited to a bench
trial. 9 This precludes a jury, which must be more sympathetic to the
patient's plight, upon hearing the case."

73

.1

74 See Saver, supranote 2, at

1104 n.45. See also NVolf, supranote 54, at 2061.
s Compare Lowery v. HealthChicago Inc., 1994 WL 194265, at *4 (N.D. IIl., May 16, 1994)
("Underthe arbitrary and capricious standard, a denial of benefits will not be set aside unless the
denial was based upon a 'downright unreasonable' interpretation of the plan documents .-.
(quoting Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055,105S (7th Cir. 1990))) irithBechtold v. Physicians
Health Plan of N. Ind., Inc, 1993 WL 625573, at *5 (ND. Ind., Mlar. 19,1993), afj'd 19 F.3d 322
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[A] serious conflict of interest may require thatthe deference to be givert to the
plan's decision be slight, even zero ...." (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employeei Pension
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987))).
76
IHanis v. Mut. of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706,711 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that deferential review
is strictly limited to the record before the administrator when the decision to provide or deny
coverage is made).
77See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (19S9) (defining when the da
novo versus the more lenient "arbitrary and capricious standard of review should be applied).
7
Sqee Wheelerv. Dynamic Eng'g, Inc., 62 F.3d 634,638 (4th Cir. 1995).
7
-See Wolf supranote 54, at 2062 n.223, 2076-77 nn.341-344. See also Saver, supranote 2,
at 1104.
11 Saver, supranote 2, at 1104.
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Court Rulings
Although many of the early decisions concerning this dispute are
interesting, of particular importance in the debate between insurance
carriers and patients seeking reimbursement are the recent cases reviewed
by the courts."s This is largely because the latter involve carriers
(whether government, private, or self-insurers) who, based upon the
outcome of earlier litigation, have attempted to be increasingly specific
about the exemptions of their coverage.
Of all federal courts, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
published the most opinions confirming reimbursement denials, based
upon a specific exemption. For example, in Harrisv. Mutual of Omaha
Co., a federal employee sought a preliminary injunction against her
insurer for nonpayment of HDC-ABMT in the treatment of her advanced
breast cancer.2 The insurance company declined to issue a pre-treatment
authorization because it deemed HDC-ABMT "experimental or
investigational" in nature. 3 The patients plan had issued to her a twentyfour page brochure that specifically excluded services that were
"investigational or experimental."14 In the "Definitions" section of the
brochure, services considered to be "experimental or investiga'ional" were
defined as those delivered prior to the completion of Phase I, I, or II
trials."5 The policy further indicated that review was to be based upon
"reliable evidence," defined in the policy as published reports from
scientific literature8 6
OPM subsequently reviewed the reimbursement denial and agreed
with the insurer that HDC-ABMT was "experimental or investigative."87
OPM recapitulated the intermediary insurer's determination based on the

" Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Bechtold v. Physicians Health
Plan of N. Ind., Inc., 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Office of Civilian Health & Medical
Program of the Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health
& Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 65 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995); Bailey v. Blue Cross

& Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1994).
Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 708.

s6 Id.

s7 Harris v. Mut of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1993).
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following facts: the patient would be enrolled in a Phase II study; the
informed consent form she had signed clearly stated the study was
investigational; and eighteen published reports cited by the intermediary
supported this conclusionSS
The District Court evaluated the OPMfs decision on an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard and upheld OPM's conclusion." On appeal, the
judgment was affirmed with emphasis on the specific exclusionary
language in the policy." The appellate court also found the published
articles offered by the defense, which indicated the service was typically
delivered as part of phase II or I clinical trials, to be dispositive. 91
Finally, the court held the insurers' position to be insufficiently refuted by
the plaintiffs evidentiary submission of unpublished opinion that stated
the treatment should no longer be considered "investigational."92
In Bechtoldv. PhysiciansHealthPlan ofNorthern Indiana,Inc., the
insurer prevailed by more broadly exempting any treatment not covered
by Medicare.93 A forty-year-old breast cancer patient with "heavy" lymph
node involvement brought an ERISA-based claim to have her insurer pay
for HDC-ABMTV4 The patient's policy denied coverage for
"experimental or unproven" procedures "is considered by any government
agency, including ... the HCFA Medicare Coverage Issues Manual to be:

experimental or investigative, not considered reasonable and necessary,
or not covered under Medicare reimbursement laws."95 Although the
policy did not specifically exempt breast cancer from ABMT, it did
"exempt transplants for solid tumors (other than neuroblastoma)" under
3s Ird at 708-09.
'9 Id at711.
9 Id at 713.
91 Id

2 The plaintiffrelied on a single "confidential draft document submitted to the agency during
the OPM review. The plaintiff's oncologist indicated that the authors were "the dream team" of
oncology. The appeals court, somewhat tongue in cheek, noted, "Tlhe Dream Team paper

concludes that "[t]he use of [HDC-ABM] for selected patients with breast cancer should no
longer be considered investigatipnal." Although the Dream Team paper has not been published
in any authoritativejoumal, Dr. Broun stated that "[it] has been widely circulated throughout the
medical community and is relied upon in this field." See Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d
706, 710 (7th Cir. 1993).

93 Beehtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., Inc. 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994).
9SId at323.

95 Id. at 325-26.
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a "Noncovered Conditions" listing in the policy.96 The policy similarly
failed to specifically exempt treatments or procedures in Phase I, II, or MI
trials.
97
This denial of summary judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.

The court concluded that prior to the patient's request for this coverage,
Medicare had issued an update stating it did not consider autologous bone
marrow transplantation for breast cancer to be "reasonable and
necessary."' 8

The exemptions in the policy, in combination with

Medicare's recent decision, were found by the court to be sufficiently
"unambiguous."' 9
Specific exemption is fraught with it own problems.' 0 It requires
skillful drafting of the policy and a constant vigil for new technologies
that may be offered. The exemption of novel treatments as they evolve
increases the transaction costs of frequent renegotiation and/or the posting
of continuous addendum.10 Additionally, innovative procedures that are

not available when the policy was written are more likely to be covered
11 Id at 326.
9 Id at 329.
" But note, the Medicare update in June 1992 must have been issued coincidentally with
Bechtold's initialrequest for coverage, because her cancer was diagnosed in October 1991, at
which time she underwent a course of standard chemotherapy and irradiation. This standard
treatment, assuming the usual six cycles of chemotherapy and full course inadiation, takes
approximately nine months to deliver. The lower court record indicates the plaintiff requested a
denial hearing in September of 1992 (Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., Inc., No.
Civ.F.92239, 1993 WL 625573, at *2 (N.D Ind., Mar. 19, 1993) affd 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir.
1994)), which was requested and forwarded to Bechtold's counsel after further clarification on the
initialdenial. Although the exact dates of Bechtold's initial request is not reported, this suggests
the denial closely approximated the Medicare ruling. Even more intriguing, it is not clear from
the opinions whether the PHP administrator was indeed aware of Medicare's ,tatement when
Bechtold's request was originally denied. If not, under the limitations of an "arbitrary and
capricious" review, a crucial factor is whether or not the coures analysis is limited to those sources
utilized by the PHP administrator in arriving at the originaldenial. Without Medicare's ruling to
supply a specific exemption, it could be argued the denial becomes increasingly difficult tojustify.
See suprapp. 14-15 (noting Medicare's decision was published in the Federal Register in June of
1992). See also Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan ofN. Ind., Inc. 19 F.3d 322, 3:7 n.6 (7th Cir.
1994) (the court indicates that the HCFA ruling was in effect "at all times ielevant to this
proceeding" and that Bechtold was denied coverage in October of 1992, However, that was when
aftnal letter denying her claim was sent and thus, the material that was before PHP at the time of
the initialdenial,may be the more appropriate record to review for capriciousness).
Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., Inc. 19 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1994).
100 See Wolf, supranote 51, at 2048-49.
I01

Id.
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simply because a specific exemption is absent from the contract 1*2 As
difficult as these decisions may be for the court to face on a personal level,
legally these decisions are easy.
Many more cases exist where the insurer's refusal to pay is
predicated on an implied exemption in the contract These decisions have
often favored the plaintiffs. In Smith v. Qffice of Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Serrs., the Court of Appeals
overturned an order for a permanent injunction against the denial of
payment for HDC-PSCRI' 3 The patient was a forty-year-old woman with
advanced breast cancer' ° and the canier's decision to deny coverage was
based on the absence of "well-designed, Phase

MI

...
studies which have

journals."'10

been published in refereed medical
The program medical
director stated in a denial letter that CHAMPUS does not provide
coverage for treatments or procedures that are considered "experimental
or investigational' ' and indicated that the decision is determined by
whether the treatment meets "generally accepted standards of usual
professional medical practice in the community," which must be
supported by published results.0 7
The carrier invited the submission of documentation supporting an
alternate conclusion and, in response,' 3 the plaintiff submitted affidavits
from her oncologists, an article indicating most insurance companies
eventually pay for the procedure, and three recent district court decisions
that had enjoined CHAMPUS from denying payment in similar
circumstances. However, the plaintiff failed to send supportive
peer-reviewed literature." 9
On appeal, the court did not refer to the CHAMPUS policy manual,
which listed sixty-six specific conditions that CHAMPUS considered

102i

Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d
950 (7th Cir. 1996).
'MIdat 951.
03
1Id.
at 953.
10 Id at 952.
107 Iad at 953.
103

, Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Sevs., 97 F.3d

950,953 (7th Cir. 1996).
109 Id
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although the manual was available

when Smith's initial request was reviewed.' In any event, CHAMPUS's
conclusions were upheld by the court, which applied the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard and wrestled over whether a "substantial evidence"

test should apply for certain procedural reasons."' The medical director's
conclusion that "requisite acceptance in the medical community" means

"outcomes of Phase III clinical trials published in refened medical
journals," in the absence of this specific wording in the policy, was
3
deemed adequate under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard1
Whether the determination by the court would survive testing under
the stricter "substantial evidence" standard is questionable, which perhaps
explains why the court's opinion was withdrawn and a rehearing granted.
Affirmation of a reviewer's denial of payment, in the absence of a specific
exemption, is rare.

In sharp contrast to Smith, the Fourth Circuit decision in Wilson v.
Office of CivilianHealth andMedical Programof the UniformedServs.,

reached the same month. In Wilson the lower court found that
CHAMPUS's refusal to reimburse for the treatment was "arbitrary and
capricious."'1 4 The rationale employed by CHAMPUS wa essentially

I" See Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 65
F.3d 361,363 (4th Cir. 1995) (describing the contents of the CHAMPUS policy manual as ofluly,
1994, and in particular the numerous treatments identified specifically as "c.xperimental or
investigational" in nature).
"I Smith's request for coverage was denied in August, 1994, while Wilson's request for
coverage was denied in July, 1994. There is no suggestion in the Smith record that the defense
brought into evidence the 66 specific conditions exemplified in the CHAMPUS policy manual as
"experimental or investigational." We know these specific exemptions were in the manual when
Smith's request for coverage was denied, as indicated by the appellate record from Wilson. See
it at 363. Perhaps this was strategic on the part of defense, because they were r.ware of the 7th
Circuit's propensity to rule for the insurer in similar cases. If so, OCHAMPUS may have been
reaching for the precedential value of a rulingin its favor despite the courts inability to base its
decision on a "solid" exemption in the policy.
11 See Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Unifoimed Servs., 97
F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1996) (if CHAMPUS's decision was taken pursuant to a formal
adjudicatory hearing, which was one of Smith's options, the court would have been required to
review the decision under a "substantial evidence" test Smith's failure to request a formal hearing
by113
the agency before filing suit may ultimately have proved fatal).
1 d at 960.
114 Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 65 F.3d
361, 366 (4th Cir. 1995).
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identical to the reasoning set forth in Smith. As in Smith, PSCR rather
than ABMT was recommended as a bone marrow recovery procedure
following HDC." 5 The medical director reviewed the request and declined
payment,116 stating that "in the absence of published randomized,
[HDC-PSCR]
prospective trials, CHAMPUS must continue to consider
17
carcinoma."'
breast
of
treatment
investigational for the
The appeals panel deciding Wilson noted that HDC, ABMT, or
PSCR were not specifically listed as procedures exempted in the
CHAMPUS policy manual, while coverage for chemotherapy was clearly
provided.18 The court also noted that the manual covered ABMTs for
"certain diseases under specific circumstances," but that breast cancer was
not included." 9 The heavy reliance on absence of Phase III trials in
denying the claim was deemed most significant to the ruling, since "...
nothing in the Code of Federal Regulations or the CHAMPUS policy
manual indicates that published, Phase I clinical trial results are required
before a benefit can be provided.!"21 The court found "while the omission
is not dispositive, the [agency's failure] to list LHDC-PSCR] as an
,experimental or investigational procedure' in its own policy manual"
significant. 121 Inthis case the Fourth Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit,
weighed heavily an absentspecific exemption, and gave little deference
to the reviewer's conclusions. Other federal circuits have taken similarly
action when a specific exemption was absent."
15ld at362.
1 6 Reaat 363.

1 Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 65 F.3d
361, 363 (4th Cir. 1995).
20 .,d at 365.
n' Id at366 (discussing anumber offactors the panel found indicative that this treatment vas
not experimental, such factors included: the procedure!s explosive gro%th, a quote from a
renowned physician from theNational Cancer Institute indicating that in the context ofa clinical
rialHDC-PSCR is an accepted treatment, a paper published by the American Society of Clinical

Oncology suggesting insurers should be supporting clinical trials, and an inexplicable quote by
Dr. Bogner indicating there are "home ran treatments' that are so successful, Phase III trials aren't
necessary (emphasis added)).
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995) (ordering injunction
against denial because policy covered other types of cancer, and failed to specifically exclude
breast cancer from HDC-ABNMI; Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir.
1995) (reversing summary judgment for insurer when plan did not specifically exclude
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Another recent case demonstrates the difficulty insurers may face
when specific exemptions are attempted but deemed incomplete. In
Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, the policy stated
"[ajutologous bone marrow transplants or other forms of stein cell rescue
(in which the patient is the donor) with high dose chemotherapy or
radiation are not covered" (emphasis added).2 The policy went on to
specifically identify breast cancer as a disease to which this exemption
applied. 124 Chemotherapy was listed as covered, while HDC was not
specifically exempted.'21 It is not clear whether it was the district level,
or before trial, that the plaintiff conceded that PSCR was exempted from
126
payment.
On appellate review, by the Fourth Circuit the plaintiff sought an
injunction against the insurer's denial to reimburse for the HDC. 127 The

lower court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff, based on the
ambiguities of the policy, was affirmed12 and the finding that exclusion
of -IDC-PSCR does not mean the exclusion of -DC itself, was
reiterated.2 9 In this case, the court found PSCR functionally equivalent
to ABMT13 ° Other jurisdictions have found the two treatments to be
separate and distinct, and have ordered the insurer to reimburse for PSCR
despite the fact that ABMT is excluded specifically from the policy. 3'

HDC-ABMT delivered during a clinical trial); Dahl-Eimers v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986
F.2d 1379 (1lth Cir. 1993) (finding the phrase "considered experimental" ambiguous and vacating

and remanding a denial of preliminary injunction against insurer).
11 Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d 53, 55 (4th Cir. 1994).
I

124

'2

Id.at 55-56.

26 Id. at 55.
127 Ia-at 58.

123 Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia,
2
1 Ida at 57 ("Construing the exclusion for stem cell

67 F.3d 53, 58 (4th Cir. 1994).
rescue ...
with high dose chemotherapy or
radiation, Blue Cross essentially interprets 'with' as unambiguously meaning 'end"').

13OId. ("In Doe, the "rescue" procedure preceding chemotherapy and radiation involved an
(ABMT] rather than [PSCRI .... The medical principles, however, were eqtivalent to those

underlying the procedure for which Bailey seeks coverage." (citing Doe v. Group Hospitalization
&Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1993))).
13,
See Wheelerv. DynamicEngg, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 459,468 (E.D.Va. 1994), ifed 62 F.3d 634
(4th Cir. 1995) ("Although the two procedures are similar in that they both provide support for a
patient receiving high dose chemotherapy, the two are distinct procedures.... The section cited
by CHAMPUS excluding coverage for autologous bone marrow transplantation does not apply
to [p]laintiffs case."). See also Wilson v. Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
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LAW VERSUS MEDICINE: DECIDING WHAT IS
EXPERIMENTAL
Decisions made in the late 1980's through the early 1990's forced the
insurance industry to back away from broad exemptions under the
category of "experimental.' The courts found "experimental" sufficiently
vague, but more importantly, a significant section of the scientific
community provided testimony that unproven treatments were not by
definition "experimental."' Although those who testified did not provide
peer-reviewed literature to support this claim, most of the public and many
of the judiciary came to accept this as the truth. However, a small yet
persistent cadre of researchers persisted and continue to insist on
33
verification to this day.
In the absence of specific exemption, judges turn to a number of
sources including expert testimony, medical literature, and the practices
of other insurers in determining whether -DC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR
should be reimbursed.1 34 From a scientific perspective, the first and last
approach are fundamentally flawed. Until there is prospective,
randomized clinical data of statistical significance, even the most
published researcher from the finest facility cannot accurately predict the
outcome. The question then becomes how can "expert' testimony exist
absent any valid trials upon which to reach such conclusions? This issue
has evaded the courts' analyses.

-

Uniformed Ser's., S66 F. Supp. 931, 937 (B.D.Va. 1994), at'd, 65 F.3d 361 (41h Cir. 1995)
C'[A]ccording to the government, the provisions [reshicting reimbursement for] marrow
transplantation also apply to peripheral stem cell rescue. mJhe [c]ourt finds such an extension
arbitrary and capricious." (citing Wheeler, 850 F.Supp. at 463)).
2 See infrapp. 31-32. See also infranote 203 (subjecting Congress to a "barrage" ofsmHilar
"expere' opinion).

'3
See, eg., Smith & Henderson, supranote 9, at 211-12.
See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing tht
publication of Peters, supranote 19, as evidence that HDC-ABMT is not "experimentall). See
also Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 800 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Adverse court
decisions involving coverage for HDC-ABMT have forced at least one insurer to change its
coverage position: "[MJhe district court implicitly embraced Blue Cross's concession that it could
no longer consider HDC-ABMT [to treat breast cancer] experimental given the growing number
13

of adverse decisions....." (citing Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 124

n.ro
(10th Cir. 1994))).
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Similarly, the fact that a number of institutions are investigating a
particular treatment in no way suggests the treatment has acquired the
status of "standard" therapy. Experiments are done on those ihings which
are experimental, and clinical research is merely experimentation on
humans. Despite the inconclusive evidence of the value ofH[DC-ABMT
and HDC-PSCR, a recent survey of American physicians reveals that an
overwhelmingly high proportion believe the treatment to be superior to
standard chemotherapy inthe setting of metastatic breast cancer. 135 These
figures illustrate the unscientific "truths" that physicians may themselves
hold evident and if the medical community is unable to discern the
"proven" from the "hypothetical," it is not surprising the court cannot
either. But in a fee-for-service environment, one would think that the
issue ofwhether the "fox" is guarding the "chickens" might arise. 13 6 Even
when there is no such obvious potential for a conflict of interest,
researchers often have the "professional currency" of prestige and future
research funding on the line.
A recent comprehensive law review written by Denise S. Wolfon the
determination of who should pay for HDC-ABMT is reveaing. 13 7 The
author discusses in detail several cases on which expert opinion was
strongly relied. 138 She concludes, based on these opinions, that deferral
to program administrators should be eliminated altogether and that the
court should substitute a "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard
when HDC-ABMT is at issue. 39 The author, however, does not question
the role of the judiciary in making these type of determinations and therein
lies the problem. Because process skills are not well-suited to progress
disputes, the argument may be debunked.

135 See

SMrIH& HEmNDSON, supranote 9, at 201 (80 percent ofAmerican phycicians surveyed

stated that they believed women with metastatic breast cancer should receive HDC-AflMTs,
despite the inconclusive evidence of superiority).
6

See, e.g., John L. Cova, A SWiOt Response to a "Modest"Proposal,84 1 NAIYL CANCER INST.
744, 745 (1992) (an editorial by a spokesman of the Health Insurance Association of America
suggesting those institutions offering HDC-ABMT are focusing on increasing their market share
of patients, irregardless of the clinical efficacy of the treatment).
137Wolf, supranote

51, at 2065.

13SId at2066.
39

I at 2065. Parenthetically, Wolfv. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995)
1d
was an ERISA-based hearing on the denial of funding for HDC-ABMT under an "experimental"
exclusion. The appeal was from a district court ruling granting summary judgment for the insurer.
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The first case examined by Wolf is Taylor v. Blue Cross/BlueShield
of Michigan, where the refusal to reimburse was based upon an
"experimental" exclusion.140 "Experimental" was not specifically defined
in the policy 141 and the trial court found the expert testimony highly
persuasive. 42 The treating oncologists testified that "the modified
HDC-ABMT was truly the only way [the patient] could become free of
cancer for at least two or three years" (emphasis added). 43 There is no
mention in the record, nor any query by either the state trial or appellate
court how such a prediction could be made.
Additional testimony on behalf of the patient came from a doctor
whom the court noted was the founder of the Michigan Society of
Hematology. 44 This "expert" testified at trial that this association had
issued a position paper stating HD C-ABMT was an "an effective form of
therapy for breast cancer."'145 Based predominately on this evidence, the
appellate court concluded that HDC-ABMT "is neither experimental nor
research in nature..."' 46
Wolfs second case, Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia,
is even more striking for the judgment rendered' 4 7 The court first
discounted the conclusion made by the physician who reviewed and
denied the patient's claim because he was not an oncologist and "merely
gave an opinion on a topic outside his area of expertise:'14 The court then
listed the vast number of medical centers the plaintiffs "expert" witness
had testified were "using" the treatment. 4 9 The court concluded that
"[t]his is convincing evidence that the treatment has 'scientifically proven
"I Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 517 N.W.2d 864 (1994).
141Id at 868
14 Id4 at 869.
4 Equally strange is the testimony, "[if'she chose conventional chemotherapy, her life
expectancy would have been measured in months...." IK
144 Id4
'4 Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 517 N.W.2d 864, 869 (1994).
147 Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue
14
"1

Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 5S6 (E.D.Va.1990).

14 at 591.

The hospitals listed therein are Duke Univ., Fairfax Cty. Hosp., George Washington Univ.,

Georgetown Univ., Harvard Univ., Johns Hopkins Univ., Medical College of Virginia, Houston's
M.D. Anderson Hosp., Univ. of Chgo., Univ. of M., Univ. ofNeb., Univ. of Texas-San Antonio,

Univ. of VA. Medical Ctr., Univ. of WI., Yale Univ. Medical School, and all Florida teaching
hospitals. IM
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value' and is 'in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice."' ' 0
Perhaps most revealing was the accompanying dicta, which borders
on the incredulous. The court wrote:
:.. [m]any treatments become accepted without Phase In studies,
in part, it appears, because these studies, by their nature, are
difficult to conduct. In general, Phase III studies randomize
patients and then administer a medical procedure to one group and
a placebo to another, and finally compare the results (emphasis
added).' 51
The axiom is that Phase III trials compare standard therapy to new
therapy, not to a placebo. The court continued,
"[according to Dr. Beveridge, patients are reluctant to be
randomized and to run the risk of being members of the placebo
group. Dr. Beveridge pointed to a Phase I study of
[HDC-ABMT] at Duke University that, for more than a year, has
unsuccessfully attempted to accrue subject patients. Simply put,
patients are unwilling to risk receiving the placebo treatment when
ample evidence suggests that the true treatment will improve their
conditions. Thus, the absence of extensive data comparing
[-DC-ABMT] treatment with a control group is relevant, but
neither determinative nor ultimately persuasive of the treatment's
status as an experimental medical practice. 52
Although it is beyond beliefthat a proclaimed "expert" on. the subject
could testify that patients were given placebo treatment in the standard
treatment arm of Phase III experiments, even if we assume the "expert"
was confused it does not explain the court's conclusion that the
experimental arm is therefore the true treatment. Unfortunately, in
subsequent opinions this dicta has been widely quoted, despite the Pirozzi

150 Id

15 d at 593-94.
1 Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 586, 593-94 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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court's proclamation that the ruling was "not a green light signaling a
general expansion of coverage ... ,,"
In the third case discussed by Wolf; Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield
ofConnecticut,the author failed to note that the judge completely jumbled
the issues.154 Despite a policy explicitly stating that services of an
experimental nature would notbe reimbursed, itwas concluded the refusal
was "arbitrary and capricious," because it did not provide a standard by
which "nonexperimental" could be determined. 55
In Bucci, the claims reviewer employed a five-factor test to detemine
coverage. 56 One factor was a demonstration of medical benefit at least
equal to that offered by established alternative treatment.'7 The court first
discounted this as subjective,' and then proposed the reasonable,
substantial, or responsible standards upon which legal issues are judged
should be used as the reviewer's measure (i.e. appropriate medical practice
in the community).Y 9 Finally, the court made the leap, based upon the
plaintiffs evidence, that application of such a standard supports the
approval of treatment 6
The coures thinking in Bucci is difficult to understand. At one point
in the opinion they suggest that because HDC-ABMT had been proven
superior in other cancers, it would be beneficial in breast cancer."' At
another point they suggest that either the plan should have contained, or
the reviewer should have employed, a "particular test, or ... a particular
53 Id at 595. See, e.g., Bucci v. Blue and Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut 764 F. Supp.
728,733 (D. Conn. 1991).
11 Bucci, 764 F. Supp. 728.
-5 Id at 733.
1'The procedure must include the following- (1) government regulatory approval; (2) evidence
'which permits conclusions as to the effect on patient health; (3) demonstrated improvement of the
patienfs health; (4) demonstration of medical benefit at least equal to that offered by established
treatment; and (5) improvement other than in investigational settings. Id. at 731.
157Id
"'Bucci i%Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticu, 764 F. Supp. 728, 732 (D. Conn. 1991).
159

1d.

160Id. at 732-33.
161The court failed to appreciate that breast cancer is a solid tumor, and that a procedure or
treatment for one cancer does not apply to another cancerpor se. Sce dd at 733 (positing that
HDC-ABMT provides a benefit in several forms of cancer) (citing Dozna v. Crum & Forster Ins.,
716 F. Supp. 131, 136 (D.N.L 1989) ('In a way ...we are really splitting hairs in the sense that
once one accepts ABMT as a technique for one indication it is a short wvay to accepting it for all
of the non-solid tumors.")).
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threshold of statistical success in terms of a cure or survival rate" on
which to base denial. 162 In reaching its decision, the court failed to
recognize that the real issue is whether the costly treatment should be paid
for when there exists no useful evidence of its superiority over less
expensive standard treatment.
In Wolfs article, she actually makes two suggestions about how the
courts should handle these lawsuits. First, she suggests that the court
"resolve ambiguities about the experimental status of a treatment by
making an independent determination through de novo review, without
deferring to the ERISA plan administrator."' 6 Wolf seems to believe that
insurance claim reviewers are biased toward denying patients deserved
benefits, and that consequently their decisions are destined to be an "abuse
of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious" by nature.
If indeed a conflict of interest is present for claim reviewers, we may
rely on the market forces within the competitive insurance industry that
tend to counter temptations to deny patients proven therapies.
Interestingly, Wolf, like many courts before her, fails to address the
potential conflict of interest facing plaintiffs' "experts," who are usually
the patients' treating oncologists, or their counterparts from major
research institutions. Instead, Wolf postulates that it would be preferable
to have judges, with questionable understanding of the methods of
scientific analysis, determine a novel treatment's "experimental" status.
Inher second recommendation, Wolf addresses plans that specifically
deny coverage for procedures performed under protocol. She Suggests that
the court, if it finds a treatment to be "nonexperimental" upon a de novo
weighing of the evidence, should decide whether a "primary purpose to
benefit the patient" is present.16" The flaw in cognition here, however, is
that "a primary purpose to benefit the patient" cannot possib.{y be found
until treatment has been fully established as beneficial, a process that
requires scientific determination through Phase EI randomized trials.
Consequently, the absence of reliable Phase Ill data upon which denials
of reimbursement have been centered make Wolfs conclusions illogical.

162 Bucci, 764 F. Supp, at 733 (citing Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 741 F.
Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Va. 1990).
163 Wolf, supra 51, at 2065.

164 ML
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Finally, Wolf agrees in her article that when a treatment is exempted
specifically, the contract should be left standing. 65 The adjudication in
such cases focuses on whether the carrier has met the properprocess
criteria of defining terms unambiguously and excluding specific
procedures they do not intend to pay for. Since the decline of lassezfaire
the judiciary has appreciated formally that no decision can sometimes be
a decision. However, Wolfs assertion that the court ought to complete
a de novo review of the case, or in any other way decide the issue of
whether a treatment is or is not "experimental" in nature, should not be
followed. Clearly, to allow the court to do so would require the use of
skills that most judges simply do not possess.
Another recent review of these cases presented by Richard S. Saver,
condemns judicial activism and articulates a variety of problems inherent
in the assessment of breast cancer treatments by the court. 10 In his paper,
Saver argues there are legitimacy, capacity, and policy reasons why
payment for new procedures should not be determined legally. 167
First, with regard to legitimacy, Saver finds it "disturbing" that
to make
"several court opinions have strayed beyond the contract issues ...
conclusive statement about technology's cost-effectiveness or net health
outcome measurements." 6 ' He suggests that the enforcement of
exclusion clauses because the treatment is "experimental" will lead to
reduced insurance premiums and health care spending overall. 1' 9 In
addition, Saver points out that individual patients may reject conventional
therapy and pursue frivolous or unproven treatments. Even when no
alternative treatments exist, individuals with fatal illness' may need
protection from health care suppliers maling fraudulent claims of cures.'7
It is the legislative branch, not the judiciary, that should be deciding these
issues. 71
Overall, Saver's argument makes sense except the conclusion that
enforcement of "experimental" exclusions will lead to more predictable

t Id at 2104.
166Saver, supranote 2, at 1117.
167

Id

leg Id
1 9 Id at 1118.
noiat
17

lIaat 1117.
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interpretation of contract provisions.' m The court is correct to emphasize
the need for specific exclusions ifthe predictability of legal outcome is the
goal, and patients are entitled to know what will or will not be covered in
their policies. If a patient desires that a questionable treatment be covered,
he or she should have to pay for that option.
Some government officials agree with the view that patients should
have to fund questionable treatment. Virginia now offers insurance
specifically for bone marrow transplantation. 73 The Clinton health care
reform plan would also permit such supplemental policies.174 Much like
disability insurance, these supplementary plans shift the financial burden
to those who feel the risk is worth ameliorating and at the same time,
clearly establish the intent of insurers to deny such coverage.
While the legislature should play a major role in clarifying the rights
of insurers and subscribers, on occasion it has failed to protect consumers
from "quack" therapies. The history of chiropractice, and the recent
upsurge in "alternative" medicine, lend support to this conclusion. 75 A
more recent example is the mandate from the State of Washington that
carriers reimburse all licensed "natural" healers. 176 On a grander scale the
federal government has allocated major funding to the newly created
Office of Alternative Medicine." Consequently, one wonders whether
leaving these decisions in the hands of the legislature is truly wise.
Nonetheless, there are even graver legitimacy questions in having the
judiciary make such decisions.
In response to lawsuits challenging insurance reimbursement, several
states have already passed legislation requiring coverage for .ABMT and

1
7Saver suggests that enforcement of experimental exclusion clauses will cause contract
provisions to be interpreted by the court more predictably, but this would only occur when the
court could find aspecific exclusion in support. See icL
173 Choice and HealthInsurance, WASH]NGTONPOST, Apri.5, 1994, atAl8.

174Id

See Charles Krauthammer, The Return of the Primitive,TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, at 82.
Id.
17" See Peggy Eastman, Cancer Tops Queries to NIH's Office of Alternative Medicine,
ONCOLOGY TIMS, Mar., 1996, at 24 (describing the "fringe" therapies being looked at by the
OAM which was created by Congressional mandate in 1992 in response to public demand - the
initial $2 million budgeted has been increased to $5.4 million as of last year).
1
176
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PSCR,
while other states are contemplating similar measures. 17
Although legislatures are no more prepared to make decisions regarding
the legitimacy of new therapies than are courts, they are at least held
accountable to all parties directly and indirectly affected by legislation.
In addition, legislators also have at their disposal scientific advisors, as
well as the ability to convene legislative fact-finding hearings through
which to define the problem and to devise a solution.
One of the most important reasons why courts are unfit to make these
significant decisions is that the judiciary lacks the capacity "to make
accurate judgments about new technologies."I" ' As Saver notes, court
assessments are done "on an ad hoc, reactive basis" often relying on
distorted information and anecdotal testimony from clinicians."' Because
"litigation is too crude a process for resolving differences of medical
opinion."' Saver suggests the slow meandering "scientific discourse'
should not be decided in an immediate winner-take-all arena. In It is
difficult to disagree with Saver's view since published decisions indicate
that some courts are aware of their distinct capacity limitations, while
many others are not.8 4
Finally, Saver also argues that scarce health care resources are being
devoted to litigation rather than more efficient methods of assessing new
technology."s In addition, the outcome of a ruling may depend on where
the case is heard, leaving patients and insurers treated inequitably."" Most

"7S See Patricia Lopez Baden, Bill on Marrow Transplantsfor Breast CancerClearsHouse,
STAR-TRIB. - Ma'aIOLIS-ST. PAUL, May 4, 1995, at IA (noting a bill requiring all Minnesota
insurance companies to cover bone marrow transplants for breast cancer patients had received final
state legislative approval).

See Saver, supranote 2, at 1116-17 nn.125-26.
Id at 1118-19.
k at 1119.
Id
112 H (noting that "[t]echnologies are diffused into practice in stage3, gradually winning
acceptance by clinicians, journal editors, and other.").
19 Id
"
'

'" ComparePirozzi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. V. 1990)

(finding HDC-ABMT is not experimental largely based on expert testimony at trial) with Harris
v. Mut. of Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding the court can only make
determinations as to the contract status, and can not determine whether IDC-ABMT is indeed

experimental or not).
' Saver, supra note 2, at 1119 (noting that "[m]any cases are litigated case after caze.").
I Id at 1120.
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astutely, Saver suggests that using the court as the deciding forum may
result in "strategic gamesmanship,"' and encourages insurers to "deny
[claims routinely], and reverse themselves only when faced with a
serious, bona fide court challenge.s ' 8 Ultimately, this may lead
developers of new technologies to turn to the court to have their
discoveries declared nonexperimental as a time-saving and cost-reducing
alternative to rigorous scientific scrutiny.18 9
Overall, litigation has lead to some advantageous policy-oriented
changes. Insurers now pay more attention to the drafting of their
contracts, with a focus on specifying exemptions so that average
policyholders are better informed regarding their coverage before illness
strikes. If coverage does not comport with the buyers expectations, an
alternative carrier may be sought.
It is also clear that litigation has shifted insurers' positions on the
issue. In 1991, Blue Cross-Blue Shield, the provider of a significant
proportion of health insurance nationwide, committed major funding to a
multicenter trial which it is hoped will definitively determine the scientific
merits ofIHDC-ABMTs.1w Blue Cross-Blue Shield allocated $10 million
to fund this project, but predicated reimbursement on patient participation
in a carefully designed, prospectively randomized, Phase III tial.'9' This
turnaround garnered them tremendous media attention, and positive
19
publicity will likely serve this carrier beyond the promised $10 million. 2
In one interview, a Blue Cross representative admitted that the "easy"
decision would have been to give up and pay for the procedure 93 and that
it was "... a tempting idea from a public relations standpoint ...as well as
187

Id.

188
Id
189

Id
190 See, e.g., Altman, supranote 29, at Al.

191Id. (discussing the $10 million anticipated cost of funding the treatment during the initial

pilot study of 1,200 women).
111d; See also LisaM. Krieger, InsurerOffers Hope in Breast CancerWar. Blu ShieldAgrecs
to PayforLast-Ditchand ControversialTherapyStill UnderStudy, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMI ER

Jan. 20, 1995, at A25 (this is another headline that "speaks for itself').
11 Blue Cross andBlue Shield AssociationSetting Precedentby Funding ClinicalTrialsfor
Women with Advanced Breast Cancer,"lA"SPLATrNEws,Nov. 17, 1995, availablein WestLaw,
WestLaw Library, ALLNEWS File, 1995 WL 10121002 (discussing the views of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield as expressed by Susan Gleeson, vice president of health management strate;ies and director
of BC/BS's Technology Evaluation Center).
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to stem the tide of a mounting number of lawsuits ... [but that would
mean] this information no longer would be routinely collected."' 94 No
doubt Blue Cross thought carefully about their reversal and not only did
they enhance their public image, but they will also save enormously in
immediate litigation costs. IfHDC-ABMT proves to be without benefit,
they will save even more in the future.

The courts' willingness to use the "Blues" position to support the
conclusion that the procedure is no longer "exTerimental," has further
prodded other carriers into providing coverage. 19s For example, a federal
directive was issued in 1994 ordering insurance providers for government
employees to similarly cover HDC-ABMT costs.1 5 Unfortunately,
however, the directive exempts government employees from protocol
participation'9 and will hinder study accruals' 9 3 and delay finding
answers.

99

194

1d

195
See Altman, supranote 29, at Al.
' In 1994, reimbursement forHDC-ABMT and HDC-PSCR in the treatment of breast cancer
was mandated for those plans covering government employees. This group has been exempted
from randomization. See, e.g., Winslow, AccessIQualiol/CostBone Marrow Transplant;: OPM
Sparkr Contrem,, A UCANPOLMTICALNMWORK-AM MRICAn HEALTHLIWm, Nov. 17,1994,
availablein WestLaw, WestLaw Library, ALLNEWS File (discussing the "directiveP from OPM
requiring 350 health plans covering nine million federal workers and their dependents to "cover
an expensive and controversial breast cancer treatment" within 24 hours, or face exclusion from
FEHBP - the conclusion is that the move was largely political, and the piece includes strong
statements ofcondemnation because the directive "threatens the progress ofthose very trials' by
preventing health care plans from requiring federal employees to participate).
197M

198 Slow accrual has been a major obstacle to completion of the Phase II studies. 'Exp.ert
testimony proffered in one case stated that the problems Duke University had in accruing research
subjects was that the standard therapy arm was to be given a placebo. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Virginia, 741 F. Supp. 536,594 (EDD. Va. 1990). One wonders, ifaphysician andjudge
maintain this opinion, how pervasive this idea may be in the general public. It is clear that
Congress must have embraced a similar concept in mandating coverage for federal employees
regardlessofprotocol participation. See infranote 203.
' 99Atthe Congressional hearing which lead to this decision, affidavits from twenty-two 'exp:rts"
in breast cancer, all of whom were from prominent institutions and considered to be preeminent
in the field of oncology, were entered into the record. Also entered were the sworn certifications
ofthirty-one practictioners from around the country as demonstrative of the consensus ofmedIcal
opinion. It is probable that this compelling testimony, suggesting HDC-ABNfI was not
experimental, contributed to the Congressional decision to force OPM to exempt government
employees from randomization. This demonstrates what can happen when the testimony is too
convincing. In essence, these researchers have "shot themselves in the foot as the lack of patient
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HELPING COURTS REACH BETTER DECISIONS
The issue of reimbursement for the controversial treatment of
HDC/AMBT was summed up recently by Circuit Judge Coffey who
stated:
In order to resolve the question of whether health insurance
providers should cover treatments like HDC/ABMT, the prudent
course of action might to be to establish some sort of regional
cooperative committees comprised of oncologists, internists,
surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical school administrators,
economists, representatives of the insurance industry, patient
advocates and politicians. Through such a collective task force
perhaps some consensus might be reached concemiag the
definition of experimental procedures, as well as agreement on the
procedures, which are so cost prohibitive that requiring insurers to
cover them might result in the collapse of the health care industry.
While such a committee would in no way be a panacea for our
skyrocketing health care costs, it may help to reduce the incidence
of suits in which one "expert" testifies that a procedure is
experimental and another equally qualified "expert" testifies to the
opposite effect?'
Interestingly, Judge Coffey does not include representatives from the
judiciary in his cooperative groups. Perhaps Coffey would feel differently
if the current pressure on existing judges to somehow become
well-informed on areas of science could be reduced by the creation of an
adjunct judicial office for "expert" magistrate judges (MJE) 20 ' made up of
technically proficient adjudicators functioning mainly at the district court
level. These MJEs would sometimes serve as special masters, other times

protocol participation will continue to slow the completion of Phase HI trials. I suspect those
witnesses did not anticipate that an exemption from protocol participation would result. See
FederalEmployees HealthBenefits PlanFEHBPCoverage ofHDC/ABMT Treatmentfor Breast
Cancer:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CompensationandEmployee Benejits ofthe House
Comm. on Post Office andCivilService, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 115, 119-125 (1994) (testimony
of200
Atty. Arlene Gilbert Groch).
Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., Inc., 19 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1994).
20! See Edward V. Di Lello, Note, FightingFirewith Firefighters: A Proposalfor Expert
Judges at the TrialLevel, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1993).
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as court-appointed expert -witnesses, and, on occasion, as triers of
technical fact 202

There are, however,

certain problems with this

suggestion, which originates from Edward V. Di Lello. The difficulties
include identification of a sufficient quantity of technically-adept
magistrates, 203 intra-district inconsistencies, and whether rendered
opinions would be legally binding or appealablecP
Another approach outlined by Clark C. Havighurst that might appeal
to judges would be to have the court avoid ruling on scientific issues
altogether305 Instead of focusing on the "experimental" nature of a new
treatment or procedure, the court would be left to decide only on
contractual issues3" Services would be excluded based on cost-benefit
considerations. Because insurers logistically can not keep up with the
various new treatments that are being developed, 2 7 the carrier should
indicate in the contract, in plain language understandable to the purchaser,
an intent to be cost conscious and to state that on occasion certain
procedures with low benefit and high cost simply would not be covered.

The cost benefit determination would be made initially by the insurer,
subject to internal and external review2 s Those contracting would
202

Id at 495-503.

Di Lello does address the distribution problem, that of assigning MIEs by district in
proportion to the number of cases likely to be litigated. But he does not suggest where the
required quantity oflMJEs would comeflom. See id at495 n153. Alternatively, aparticularME
might take on one or more topics to deal with on a national level, for instance, the issue of the
"experimental" nature of HDC-ABMT being reviewed here. However, that would necessitate at
least a general understanding of the substantive aspects of the laws ofall fifty state. Additionally,
that does not solve the problem that the IWE would be prohibited from both testifying as a
court-appointed "experf' and deciding one or more issues of fact in the same case. SeiId. at49S
n.174. With this in mind, one now needs at least two M'Es with technical expertise on a particular
issue. In the not so rare instance of several trials occuring simultaneously, additional MrEs would
be required, unless the trials were so staggered to allow these MJEs to "jet across the country and
thus to be present to participate in other ongoing litigation.
2u Id at 498.
2S See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE COMTRACIS AS INSTRUENTS
OF HEALTHREFonI (1995).
2m Id at 187-190.
207 Id at 195.
2 1 "Even though a contract cannot specify precisely the services to be provided in each cast,
the parties might agree to a kind of relational contract establishing both a general standard by
which coverage will be determined and a process for interpreting and applying that standard in
future situations. The specific contractual strategy proposed here is (1) clear delegation of initial
responsibility for interpreting the plan's obligations to health professionals selected by the plan and
203
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stipulate that the insurer is allowed to make such decisions, subject to
review by an agreed upon and pre-selected alternative dispute resolution
source (ADR), should a conflict arise.
An even better solution may be a national "Science Court," 209 as
proposed by Professor Steven Goldberg of Georgetown Law School,
where issues like the "experimental status" of a new medical treatment
could be argued in front of technologically knowledgeable individuals for
resolution.21' A similarly-fashioned panel might address the issue at hand.
It is clear from the amount of litigation ongoing that the "experimental"
nature of HDC-ABMT or J-DC-PSCR is of national, as opposed to
regional, concern; therefore, a national form of arbitration may be
appropriate.
An extension of Goldberg's "Science Court," perhaps a."Treatment
Court" for the lack of a better label, might serve this function. The
tribunal would not only evaluate the science but also consider formally
the societal costs and benefits of a new therapy. First; the issue of whether
the treatment or procedure was scientifically sound would be addressed.
If it was found not to be so, their analysis would stop. But if scientific
merit was deemed present, the review would continue on to the potential
economic impact of its applications. This, of course, would requirejudges
with both scientific and economic backgrounds and it would be reasonable
to have all of the major areas of science (such as physics, biology,
chemistry, etc.) represented. To limit capture potential and establish an
experienced tribunal, a life-time appointment may be wise, and certainly
a prohibition against participation in the private sector would be
warranted.
It is likely that issues would become apparent to this Treatment Court
only after a certain threshold of individual conflict arose. A petition for
review would be filed, perhaps by research organizations, or classes of
citizens, or groups of insurers, and amicus briefs might be solicited. Much
like the Supreme Court, a grant or denial of certiorarimight result. Novel

(2) designation of a disinterested arbiter, selected through a freestanding altermative dispute
resolution (ADR) service, to hear appeals from the decisions reached." Idat 201
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treatments not yet available clinically could be evaluated directly while
issues between individual litigants continue to be brought in front of
existing tribunals. When the issue surpasses some threshold level of
litigation, the Treatment Court would be called upon.
To preserve our current judicial structure, it would seem reasonable
to grant a Treatment Coures decisions no precedental value per se.
Rather, their findings would have persuasive significance and their
decisions would be published with reasoned elaboration encouraged and
be legally admissible. Due to the national significance of the tribunals
decisions, and the varied state doctrines that exist, the focus would be on
factual issues. The result would be that judges and/or juries in the
traditional forum would benefit from the Treatment Court's unbiased
factual guidance, especially with regard to subsequent litigation,
lessening the "battle of the experts" problem.
Because suits are less likely to be filed where the potential outcome
has been clarified, a secondary effect of such a court would also inure. It
is likely that a reduction in reitigation of the same issues would follow
and such suits might be further discouraged by the judicious granting of
both court costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party when
appropriate. Needless to say the members of such a Treatment Court
would wield significant power and, like administrative agencies, should
be appointed by the Executive Branch and could perhaps be limited to
those nominated through national medical societies.
CONCLUSION
Considering the complexity of this issue, it is clear there is no easy
solution. But what is clear is that breast cancer is a devastating disease
and undoubtedly better treatment is sorely needed. Currently, however,
it is unfortunate, but true, that there exists no reliable or, scientifically
valid evidence that HDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR improves the results of
treatment from that obtained by the best available standard therapy.
All that can conclusively be said about HD CAMBT and HDCPSCR
is that these treatments are significantly more expensive than standard
therapy. If a breast cancer patient wishes to receive treatment using these
new techniques that should certainly be her prerogative, but unfortunately
the expense is such that only the wealthy can afford to pay for it
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themselves. As the case history demonstrates, a patient who purchases
protection against this catastrophe and is denied coverage by her policy
may turn to the courts for relief, and if her carrier was ambiguous or
unclear as to whether or not it intended to pay for the procedure,
reimbursement will likely be ordered. On the other hand, if the policy
clearly indicates the carrier's intent to pay only for treatments proven
scientifically to be beneficial, the patient's request should and will likely
be denied.
Unfavorable decisions in this regard have stimulated carriers to draft
their policies in a fashion so as to be better understood by the purchaser.
As a result, one would expect these suits to decrease in frequency. This
is true for both breast cancer, and the myriad other diseases for which
research is ongoing. The recent appellate level cases (at least in the 7th
Circuit) would suggest this is occuring. Legislative action should likewise
help to decrease courtroom disputes, allowing judges to be able to return
to doing what they do best deciding outcomes onprocessconsiderations.
As physicians and scientists continue to try and figure out how to
best help breast cancer patients, it is also hopeful that this legal dilemma
will resurrect interest in Phase I verification of novel treatments and that
more insurers will follow Blue Cross' lead and predicate reimbursement
on participation in randomized trials. Patients who want access to new
treatments without being randomized will have to either pay directly, or
buy extra insurance. Alternatively, they might elect legislators who will
mandate access. If so, the people will pay collectively for the expenses
a small segment will incur. CHAMPUS's recent decision to fund any
NCI-sponsored Phase H or Phase Il clinical trial supports this
conclusion.2 1 Their lead should be applauded because unlike OPM's 1994
directive, treatment coverage for HIDC-ABMT or HDC-PSCR through
CAMPUS will be dependent on protocol participation.2 It is hoped
that some solution will be found.

2

'See Jane Erickson, GettingManagedCare to Payfor ClinicalTrials,ONCOLOGY Tas, Mar.

1996, at 1, 17 (CHAMPUS, covering approximately 10 million people, estimates 350 enrollments
from its 11,760 members anticipated to be diagnosed with cancer this year. This pilot project will
be funded from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 1996, although it may be extended
dependent
upon costs).
2 12
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